Rod Satterwhite and David Greenspan are members of the Labor & Employment group at McGuireWoods LLP. Both handle employment litigation on behalf of employers, and advise companies on employment issues regularly.

June 2009 - Posts

Email Bites Employer - Again

I never get tired of these cases.  Last week, an Idaho Federal District Court recently denied summary judgment to an employer in an age discrimination case.  In Wold v. El Centro Fin., Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50958 (D. Idaho June 16, 2009), the plaintiff argued that he had been rejected for a position because of his age, 46. 

As is common these days, much of the hiring process was electronic.  Wold emailed his resume to El Centro, expressing his interest in a job opening.  The resume made its way around the company, and ended up in the inbox of the company CEO.  The CEO, apparently thinking that he was responding to his own HR staff, actually sent an email to the plaintiff which stated, in part:  "Damn. I'm here late trying to get through emails -- I just saw this one I missed somehow and it is a week old. Check it out -- I don't know what I think. He must be old -- and just looking for something to do."

Do I even need to tell you how the story ends?  Wold doesn’t get the job, and sues for age discrimination.  The employer moves for summary judgment, and loses, primarily because the court concluded that the email from the CEO was evidence of discriminatory intent.  No kidding.

Likewise, do I even need to discuss what might be “lessons learned” from this case?  1) Don’t refer to protected characteristics when making employment decisions, especially not in writing; and 2) Check that TO: field before you hit send.  

New Supreme Court Case Takes an Arrow Out of an ADEA Plaintff's Quiver

The Supreme Court case, Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., is a pro-employer case that makes it more difficult for workers to establish age discrimination.  In a sharply divided 5-4 ruling, the majority (by way of an opinion from Justice Thomas) held that an employee asserting federal age discrimination bears the responsibility to prove that age was the main factor that led to the alleged adverse employment action.  In Gross, the case centered on whether employees in non-Title VII cases must present direct evidence of discrimination to secure a "mixed motive" jury instruction, which would then shift the burden of proof to the employer (note - this opinion does not impact an employee's ability to prove age discrimination by direct or circumstantial evidence).  Instead of directly responding to that issue, the majority stated that "[t]his court has never held that this burden-shifting framework applies to ADEA claims[,] and we decline to do so now."  Holding that a plaintiff's burden of proof under ADEA is tougher than it is under Title VII, the majority opinion noted that "the ADEA's text does not authorize an alleged mixed-motives age discrimination claim.  "To establish a disparate treatment claim under [the ADEA text], a plaintiff must prove that age was the 'but for' cause of the employer's adverse decision."  

 

A few initial comments on the case:

 

(1) The opinion does not directly impact an employee's ability to prove age discrimination by direct or circumstantial evidence.  Thus, while a burden-shifting jury instruction in ADEA mixed motive cases are "out for now" (see comment below), an age claims will still turn on the evidence (both direct and circumstantial) developed in the record.  I do not see this case as having a material impact on the number of age claim brought by jilted employees, however I do think the opinion will impact where the claims are brought, which brings me to Point No. 2. 

 

(2) Many states have their own FEP statutes that will deviate from this precedent.  Although states vary, most states "bundle" protected classes into one FEP statute and the mixed motive standard and burdens are established under state law precedent.  Indeed, Gross is, at its core, a statutory interpretation case.  So I don't see its impact trickling down to age claims under state law. 

 

(3) The majority opinion makes so much of the 1991 Amendment to Title VII (which is the prime difference cited as to the text of Title VII and the ADEA) that I would not be a bit surprised to see an amendment to the ADEA in the next Congressional session much like we saw with respect to the ADA last year.

 

We will keep an eye on this case as it is cited and analyzed.

 

Can You Hear Me Now? -- Voice Recognition as Accommodation

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana recently issued a 41-page opinion discussing ADA accommodation requirements, including whether an employer must provide voice recognition software to an employee who suffered from a loss of fine motor skills.

The plaintiff, Maria Picard (“Picard”), was a medical transcriptionist who had carpal tunnel syndrome and a degenerative neuromuscular disease.  While on FMLA leave for carpal tunnel surgery, Picard asked her supervisor for permission to use a particular brand of voice recognition software – Dragon Naturally Speaking – and for permission to either use a quiet room or to work nights and weekends.  Picard asserted that this software would allow her to transcribe without relying on her limited fine motor skills.  After consultation with Human Resources, the Hospital denied her request.  Picard later submitted two letters from physicians which opined that her condition represents a significant handicap in her profession and that she be permitted to use the Dragon software.  The Hospital concluded that at the time, the letters did not indicate a medical necessity, and because she was meeting the productivity requirements, they would not fulfill the request.  Picard later resigned and took a position at a different medical center. 

She sued her former employer, alleging discrimination and retaliation under the ADA.  The Court ultimately held that Picard produced sufficient evidence to raise a jury issue on her failure to accommodate claim based on St. Tammany’s denial of voice recognition software that could minimize painful typing.   

The Hospital initially argued that Picard could not show she is “disabled” under the ADA.  The Court, however, noted that the vast majority of federal courts to consider CMT have treated it as an ADA-covered disability, and held that although an inability to type, standing alone, is insufficient to show that a plaintiff is disabled, here Picard “claims to have great difficulty holding heavy objects, doing household chores, typing, writing, turning pages, tearing pieces of paper, using a stapler, and doing ‘anything with fine motor skills.’”  The Court determined that based on this evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that Picard was substantially limited in the major life activity of performing manual tasks. 

The Hospital next argued that requiring the purchase of voice recognition software, and the other requests, were not reasonable accommodations.  The Court, however, found that there was “nothing facially unreasonable about [the] request to have a software program installed on her computer and to be permitted to work in quiet conditions.  Those changes are precisely the sort of accommodations that Congress contemplated when it passed the ADA.”  The Hospital argued that it did accommodate Picard in a number of ways including its purchase of Dictaphone ExSpeech software.  However, although Picard briefly used this software, she claimed the most commonly used keystrokes were too painful because of the carpal tunnel surgery.  Additionally, although the Hospital granted Picard a leave of absence for her carpal tunnel surgery, the surgery did not cure her CMT, or otherwise address her typing limitation. 

Two important lessons flow from this case.  First, these types of accommodation-denial claims are likely to increase for employers in light of the newly enacted ADA Amendments Act, which significantly broadened the scope of “who is disabled” under the Act.  Second, it highlights the importance for employers to engage in the interactive process with employees.  Here, it appears the hospital may have assumed that providing one brand of software eliminated their obligation to consider a different one.  A more extensive dialogue with the employee may have revealed why one was better suited to the task than the other.  Based on the opinion, it’s clear that the Court understood and bought into the plaintiff’s argument on that front.