Rod Satterwhite and David Greenspan are members of the Labor & Employment group at McGuireWoods LLP. Both handle employment litigation on behalf of employers, and advise companies on employment issues regularly.

Labor Management (RSS)

NLRB Issues Key Decision Affecting Employer Email Policies

The following is the text of another client alert our L&E team sent out yesterday. 

On Sunday, December 16, the last day of the term of NLRB Chairman, Robert Battista, the Board issued a long awaited decision on employer e-mail policies. The Guard Publishing Co., 351 NLRB No. 70 (2007). This decision represents a significant change in the way the NLRB addresses the rights of employers to control their property. Since the decision applies to all private employers, whether they are union or nonunion, companies should review promptly their e-mail and related policies.

History

Reading Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act and a 1945 U.S. Supreme Court decision expansively, the NLRB had fashioned rules which held that employers could not discriminate in denying their employees use of the employers' facilities or resources for "collective" (or union organizing) purposes. The Board read the term "discrimination" so broadly that employers had to choose between permitting non-employee solicitations, such as the Salvation Army bell ringer, and the ability to exclude union pickets from their property. Similarly, an employer permitted email use for personal reasons, it could expect the Board's General Counsel to argue it could not prohibit employees from using its email system for union related purposes, including organizing, Therefore, if an employer knowingly allowed personal use, the General Counsel would argue that it was illegal discrimination for it to enforce a "business use only" restriction against pro-union use of its e-mails. A number of federal circuit courts were quite critical of the Board's broad reading of discrimination but the Board persisted.

The Decision

Like so many modern businesses, the employer newspaper company in Guard Publishing provided computers and email to its employees for use on the job. It also maintained a computer use policy which prohibited, in part, "non-job-related solicitations." Despite this policy, an employee union president, among other things at issue in the case, on two occasions sent emails from a computer in the union's office to employees at the its company e-mail addresses soliciting union support. The first, sent on August 14, 2000, urged employees to wear green to support ongoing negotiations, and the second, sent on August 18, 2000, encouraged employees to support the union's entry in an upcoming town parade. The employee received a written warning for the emails. The Union filed a charge against the employer on multiple factual grounds, including the two August 2000 emails and subsequent discipline based on the employer policy.

The controlling issues were the appropriate analogy for e-mail and what constituted discrimination. The employer briefs argued that e-mail was an employer provided resource such as telephones, bulletin boards or copying machines and was subject to abuse so that employers could control access with non-discriminatory rules. The Board's General Counsel and AFL-CIO argued that e-mail was more like rest areas and cafeterias, where employees could not be limited in their "speech" or information exchanges except on a special showing of need.

The Board agreed with the Employer's position but went further. First, it held that the employer's policy was valid. The Board concluded that the e-mail system was the employer's property and that the employees had no Section 7 right to use it for organizing purposes. It rejected the union and General Counsel's argument that the employer had to show "special circumstances" before limiting employee access for organizational purposes.

Next, the Board ruled that the employer's enforcement of its policy was not discriminatory, even though some non-business email was permitted. Citing Seventh Circuit case law, the Board held that "in order to be unlawful, discrimination must be along Section 7 lines. In other words, unlawful discrimination consists of disparate treatment of activities or communications of a similar character because of their union or other Section 7-protected status." (Section 7 allows employees to join together to form a union or engage in other "concerted activities.") Applying this analysis to the August 2000 emails, the Board noted that, although the employer "tolerated personal employee e-mail messages concerning social gatherings, jokes, baby announcements, and the occasional offer of sports tickets or other similar personal items" there was "no evidence that the" employer "permitted employees to use e-mail to solicit other employees to support any group or organization." Accordingly, the Board held the enforcement did not discriminate along Section 7 lines and was therefore permissible.

What Does this Mean?

With respect to e-mail policies, employers may now "distinguish between charitable solicitations and non-charitable solicitations, between solicitations of a personal nature (e.g., a car for sale) and solicitations to support any group or organization such as unions, political parties or religious groups. Allowing the employer to distinguish between personal and organization interests is extremely important, because the Board had previously held that if an employer allows employees to discuss personal matters, such as athletic scores, news or family affairs, it could not prohibit discussions of union matters.

Equally important, the Board clearly intends this new understanding of discrimination to apply in other contexts, including right of access to employers' property and internal non-solicitation/no distribution policies, although it excluded situations in which employees had no opportunity for face-to-face communication.

Ultimate Significance

The decision may provide less than had originally been hoped. It came in the 7th year of the Bush administration and with the expiration of Chairman Battista's term. The Board is now divided between two Democratic and two Republican Members. Members Walsh and Kirsanow serve as recess appointees, and their terms will end when the U.S. Senate adjourns in January, leaving only two members (one who voted with the majority and one who dissented). There will be limited opportunity for the President to make additional recess appointments, and it is highly unlikely that he will get Senate confirmation for two additional Republican Members, and an evenly divided Board will not likely extend the logic of Guard.

Equally important, there will be no time for appeals to the Courts of Appeal. Had they reviewed and enforced this or subsequent decisions, it would have been more difficult for the next Board majority to overturn. If the next Board is appointed by a Democratic president, overturning Guard Publishing will be high on its priority list.

In the meantime, employers now for the first time have firm guidance for e-mail policies and at the same time should reassess their access policies as well.

Email Policy Opens Doors to Union Activity

A company that allows employees to use email for personal reasons cannot prohibit union-related messages on its system.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled last week that Media General, owner of the Richmond Times Dispatch newspaper, could not enforce its electronic mail policy to prohibit union-related messages.

The case was appealed from the National Labor Relations Board, which had determined that Media General “violated sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (5), by disparately enforcing a company e-mail policy.”

In considering the appeal, the Court noted that while Media General had an official e-mail policy that “restricted use of the company e-mail system to matters related to company business,” that policy had not been consistently enforced.  Indeed, only two employees had been disciplined under the policy, and that was for accessing pornography.  The court noted that Media General’s email system “contains numerous examples of messages unrelated to the work of the newspaper.  The e-mail system was frequently used by both hourly employees and managers to convey news about the employees’ personal lives, to arrange social events, and to inform employees about charities.”  No big surprise here; show me a corporate email system, and I'll show you personal, social and charitable messages. 

Importantly, however, the Court concluded that preventing the union from using the email system for union-related business, while permitting all these other kinds of messages, was an unfair labor practice prohibited by the NLRA.  The result:  now the existing union can use the Company's system to conduct business and communicate with employees.  The implication:  for non-union employers, union organizers could use company email to persuade employees to elect a union.  All on the Company's dime.  Nice.

The lesson:  employers must exercise great care in both 1) crafting and 2) enforcing email policies.  As shown above, an unenforced policy, or one that is only sporadically enforced, can be worse than no policy at all.  Policies need to be worded both carefully and reasonably, so that employers may enforce them to prohibit not all non-business messages (which almost nobody enforces), but so that employers can minimize disruption in the workplace, and can reduce email traffic that may negatively impact productivity in the workplace.

Democrats, Unions Disgruntled with NLRB Recess Appointee, Probably for Both Cause and Effect

Responding to President Bush's recent recess appointment of Ohio labor lawyer Peter N. Kirsanow to serve on the NLRB, several Democratic Congressional leaders and union officials have voiced more than a little displeasure. Senator Ted Kennedy was quoted in the BNA Daily Labor report that Kirsanow's record "raises serious doubts about his fitness for high office and his commitment to fairness for all Americans." And who better than the good Senator from Massachusetts to suggest that one's actions might affect his "fitness for high office"? BNA also referenced Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid's unsurprisingly similar opinion that there were "serious questions" about Kirsanow's suitability for the Board. There was also grumbling from President of the AFL-CIO. It's hard to tell whether the pro-labor discontent stems more from "who" got appointed than "how," given that it was a recess appointment made without Senate confirmation. One thing is for sure--getting one step closer to a full Board will hopefully enable the NLRB to again make some significant decisions and potentially overturn precedent--something that, because it takes a three member majority to overturn Board law, it hasn't been been able to do in quite awhile.

Why T.O. Lost

         The recent arbitration decision in the grievance filed by Terrell Owens against the Philadelphia Eagles and the NFL Management Council has several timeless lessons in it for all employers, despite the high-profile/high-dollar-value parties involved.  Although the union forcefully argued that the incidents for which Owens was suspended and ultimately placed on the inactive roster were a series of isolated events, the record maintained by the Eagles through a series of letters to Owens and his agent, coupled with the testimony of the head coach regarding his conversations with the two, allowed the arbitrator to discern an orchestrated pattern of conduct aimed at forcing Owens' employer to break its contract with Owens.  Once this orchestrated pattern was established, the arbitrator had little trouble in denying the grievance. 

            The Eagles made the arbitrator's job much easier by a series of letters to Owens detailing his instances of misconduct, as well as laying out their own theory that the misconduct was simply designed to get Owens out of a contract he wished he hadn't signed.  In addition, the Eagles' letters pointed out that Owens had publicly lied on several occasions regarding a so-called "secret waiver" that Owens claimed he was forced to sign relating to his medical condition at the end of the 2004 season.  This further undercut Owens' credibility when he testified at the arbitration hearing. 

 

            Finally, the Eagles did not make a unilateral decision until very late in the game with Owens, and even then offered him a way to avoid suspension and deactivation by making a public apology and addressing his concerns with the Eagles' quarterback directly.  For whatever reason, Owens refused to speak directly either to the football team or to the quarterback, and it was at that point that the Eagles suspended him.   

            The very clear warnings communicated to Owens in several letters from Eagles management, to paraphrase the arbitrator, acted as progressive discipline, properly advising Owens of unacceptable behavior, warning him that his tenure was becoming increasingly challenged, and attempting to provide for the possibility of better behavior in the future.  When these efforts failed, the arbitrator found that a four-game suspension was appropriate.

             The arbitrator also decided that there was no limitation on the Eagles coaching staff deactivating Owens and prohibiting him from returning to the Eagles facilities for the rest of the season.  The arbitrator's focus here was very narrow, he specifically noted (italics in the original) "the challenge faced by this team, dealing with this player in these particular circumstances."  Again, the "campaign of disruption" threatened and implemented by Owens and his agent was the determining factor for the arbitrator, who noted that what the Eagles had to deal with was not past bad behavior, but an ongoing threat of continued disruption.  He found that the Eagles' coaches properly exercised their discretion to protect the team and the interests of the football club by keeping Owens away from his teammates. 

            The NFL Players Association is understandably miffed by the arbitrator's decision, but really, it appears that Owens put himself in a uniquely disadvantageous position vis a vis his employer.  The employer carefully documented the incidents of problematic conduct, announced in its correspondence with Owens its theory of what he was doing and why, and then confronted him with the prospect of discipline or corrective action, which Owens refused.  I don't think the union should be particularly worried about the precedential value here.  I cannot imagine another player putting himself in this kind of a position, and the arbitrator seems to agree.